CONTEMPT 'I COURT.
LEGAL MISCELLANY.

CONTEMPT OF COURT.
In the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New
Jersey.'
IN REFERENCE TO VIOLATION OF INTUNCTION.

THE UNITED STATES ON THE RELATION OF CHARLES GOODYEAR VS.
HORACE H. DAY.

1. A contempt of court in the United States courts must arise from disobedience of or
resistance to some decree or order in existence, hence where A, on the 17th day
of September, 1852, sold a certain patent while a suit was pending in relation to
it, and on the 28th of September, 1852 an injunction was'issued; Reld, that the
sale was no contempt. Per GREEN, Master.
2. The history of the law of contempt in the United States courts traced and discussed. Per GREEN, Master.

honorable court, by its
order dated 23d day of March, 1853, directed the subscriber, one
REPORT,

PER GREEN, MASTER.-This

of the masters of the court, to continue the examination of the

defendant in this proceeding on interrogatories to
and answered in such form as he should direct,
reports, that the said defendant attended before
to time, and answered in writing, under oath, the

be propounded
and he hereby
him, from time
several interro-

gatories to him propounded, which said interrogatories and answers

are returned to this court with this report.
The subscriber would also report, that in pursuance of the order
of the court, he examined William H. Rogers, Amos D. Wyckoff
and John Helm, witnesses produced before him at the instance of
the relator, in reference to the contempt charged in this proceeding, and he hereby returns to this court, with his report, the examination of the said witnesses.
I We present

this well considered report of an able jurist as the best examination

of the subject matter discussed to be found. Although not entitled to the rank of
ajudicialdecision, as a professional opinion, it deserves careful study.-Eds. Amer.
Law Register.
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And it is further ordered, that the said master report to the
court in writing, whether or not the said defendant is in contempt
for having violated an injunction tested on the 28th of September,
1852, and which, directed to Horace H. Day, and his agents, &c.,
commands them from thenceforth to desist and refrain from making,
using, or vending to others to be used, any manufactures, goods,
articles or materials, composed of india-rubber, prepared in the
manner specified in the patent granted to Nathaniel Hayward, as
assigned to Charles Goodyear, or in the manner specified in the
patent re-issued to the said Charles Goodyear, and from infringing
upon and violating the said patent in any way whatsoever. The
injunction is not to prevent the defendant from manufacturing
shirred or corrugated goods, and such other articles as the said
defendant is authorized to make under certain articles of agreement
made and entered into between him 'and the complainant.
It appears from the evidence that the writ of injunction was
served on Day and Rogers and Wyckoff on the same day it was
issued or the day after,.and that orders were sent to the factory at
New Brunswick, on that day, directed to Mr. Rollo, who was in
charge of the establishment, to desist from further manufacturing
any articles which would or could be considered a violation of the
injunction, and Day, Rogers, Wyckoff and Helm, the witnesses examined before the Master, all unite in saying that they believe that
the instructions were observed and carried out. But it is insisted
on the part of the relator, that Day's conduct before and after the
28th of September, amounts to a violation of the injunction, and
that he ought to be adjudged to be in contempt, and most of the
evidence taken has had reference to this point.
It appears from the examinations taken before me, that on the
17th of September, 1852, Horace H. Day executed to Rogers &
Wyckoff an absolute bill of sale, in consideration of $225,000, for
all the stock of goods, fixtures and materials, at 23 Courtland street,
New York, and the machinery, and every thing else, except water
wheels, in the factories at New Brunswick, at Piscataway, and at
Great Barrington; all india-rubber goods on consignment, and a
full license to use in their own business, all the patents or patent
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rights belonging to Day, and took in payment the promissory notes
of Rogers and Wyckoff jointly, twenty-eight in number, from sixty
days to thirty-four months, secured by mortgages on the property
included in the bill of sale, except the property at Courtland street
store; that the sum of fifty dollars was paid by Rogers & Wyckoff
to. bind the bargain ; that Day also executed leases for the factories,
&c., at New Brunswick, Piscataway, and Great Barrington, and 23
Courtland street, with conditions that he, Day, should have an
office, in which to conduct any other than an india-rubber business,
and the privilege of keeping a sign at the door, and over the entrance to his office, a rent is reserved in each of the leases, and the
term fixed is seven months and thirteen days.
Rogers & Wyckoff were the clerks of Day, and had property to
no very large amount ; no inventory was made or appraisement
had. Rogers & Wyckoff took possession and opened a new set of
books, and bought and sold, and made the usual entries in the books
of the firm of Rogers & Wyckoff, and matters continued in this way
till the 19th of October, little more than a month, when the parties
under their hands and seals, rescinded the bill of sale, leases, mortgages and licenses, and agreed to cancel the notes and mortgages,
and Rogers & Wyckoff were to account to Day for the amount sold
by them of the purchased goods, and Day agreed to allow Rogers
& Wyckoff for all cash paid by them on the purchase of goods then
mixed up with the others in the store, and to assume and pay their
credit obligations for the same.
It is insisted by the counsel for the relator, that this sale, including some vulcanized rubber, made while the suit was pending, and
with a full knowledge of the matter in dispute, is a violation of the
injunction. Several cases are cited from the English chancery
books in support of their position, and it may be well briefly to
examine these cases to ascertain how the law of contempt has been
settled in England.
The first case cited is from 14 Yesey, Jr. 136, Osborne vs. Tenant.
In this case, Lord Elden, the Chancellor, ruled, that as the party,
by his attendance in court, was apprised of what the decision of the
court would be, and that an injunction would be ordered, and left

CONTEMPT OF COURT.

the court at the moment the decision was pronounced, and did an
act to defeat such decision, the court would hold the party to the
same consequences, as if the order had been actually made.
So, also, in the case of Skip vs. Harwood, from 3 Atkins. 564,
Lord Hardwicke committed the defendant to the Fleet, for contempt, on the ground that he attended in court the whole time that
the argument was going on; was present when the opinion was
delivered, and left the court just as the decree for an injunction
was given, and removed in a fraudulent and collusive manner a part
of the partnership effects, which, by the decree, he was restrained
from doing.
But these cases are distinguishable from this case in several particulars. This case was argued in March, 1852, and no decision
was made till the 28th of September, some six months afterwards.
The merits had been discussed by able counsel on both sides, upon
a very large amount of evidence, not without some doubt as to its
weight. No intimation had fallen from the court as to their
opinion, and the case was held under advisement till the 28th of
September, 1852.
Lord Elden, in a subsequent case of James vs. Downs, 18 Vesey,
521, revives this subject, and holds this language : "a party cannot be committed for the breach of an injunction, that expres' species of contempt, unless there is an injunction. There is no instance, previous to the case of Osborne vs. Tenant, that the court
ventured to consider the act of contempt, unless the party being
present in court, heard the order for an injunction made."
That if the party was in court while the motion for an injunction
was proceeding, he should not escape the process by turning his
back before the court pronounced the order "let the injunction
go," for this would be considered a mere contrivance.
The judges appear to have laid down no general principle in these
cases ; each case seems to regulate itself, and depends much upon
the temper and peculiar mind of the judge.
To place the suitor within the entire control of the court, is not
in harmony with the free institutions of our country, and when
the matter was first debated before the master, he felt confiden6t
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that some legislative enactment would be found, which would define
the power of the court, defend its dignity, preserve its order, enforce its decrees, and at the same time protect the liberty of the
citizen. What is the legislation on this subject ?
In the act of Congress to establish the judicial courts of the
United States, approved September 24th, 1789, it is provided in
the 17th section, that all the courts in the United States should
have the power to punish by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before them, and then by the 90th rule regulating the practice
of the courts of equity of the United States, the practice of the
Circuit Court, unless provided for by rule, should be regulated by
the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, so far as
the same could be reasonably applied. The courts have therefore
taken the English cases as their guide, and continued to do so until
the year 1831, when Congress passed an act entitled an act declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court-see U. S. Statutes
at Large, by Peters, vol. 4, page 487. By this law it is enacted, that
the power of the courts of the United States to issue attachments
and inflict summary punishment for contempt of court, shall not be
construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any
person in the presence of the court, or so near as to obstruct the
administration of justice, the misbehavior of any officer in his official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by officer, party,
juror, witness, or any other person, to any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command of the court.
As this is an important act, and seems to settle the case before
the court, some pains have been taken to ascertain its origin.
We find that the Hon. James H. Peck, Judge of the District
Court of the United States for the District of Missouri, was
impeached by the House of Representatives, under the following
circumstances: He had delivered an opinion, and given judgment
in accordance therewith, in an action pending in his court, in favor
of the United States affecting the title to a large tract of land.
The losing party appealed from the decision, and before the determination of the case, Judge Peck published in one of the public
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newspapers, his opinion. The counsel for the applicant published
an article, in another newspaper, purporting to expose the errors of
doctrine and fact alleged to exist in the opinion of the judge. There
is nothing offensive in the language or manner of the article. A few
days after the appearance of the article, the judge directed proceedings to be instituted, as for a contempt; in a summary manner,
an attachment was issued against the attorney, and he was brought
before the judge, but declined submitting to interrogatories, as he
wished to recall nothing that he bad written. He was, by the
order of the judge, committed to prison for twenty-four hours, and
suspended from practicing as an attorney in that court for eighteen
months. This order was in the spirit and letter of the English
cases, and considered as a legitimate exercise of the power vested
in the court.
But the attorney protested, and the case ultimately reached
Washington, and Judge Peck was impeached by the House, and
tried before the Senate, and escaped conviction by a single vote.
The subject of contempt was discussed before the court of impeachment, by the first legal minds of the country-by Wirt and Meredith, by Buchanan and Story, and Spencer and Wickliffe. A few
days after this decision, a member of the House of Representatives
offered a resolution that the committee on the judiciary should be
directed to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute all
offences which may be punishable as contempt of the courts of the
United States, and also to limit the punishment of the same ; and
Mr. Buchanan, the chairman of that committee, reported the act of
thu 2d of March, 1831.
The action of Judge Peck was considered, by those who voted for
his conviction, as a great disparagement of public justice, as an
abuse of judicial authority, and as a subversion of the liberties of
the people of the United States.
The law passed was beyond doubt intended as a guide for the
courts, and to forbid in future all constructive contempts ; and that
the courts should make use of the writ of attachment for the protection of themselves, and not for the benefit of the party complaining.
By this act, to constitute a contempt, there must be a decree or
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order in existence, and a disobedience or resistance to such decree
or order. Apply this reasoning to the sale of the 17th of September, 1852. How can this sale be said to be a disobedience of a
decree not entered up till the 28th of September, some ten days
afterwards.
Besides, Day, and ]Rogers, and Wyckoff all unite in swearing that
they had no intention to defeat the decree of the court, for they one
and all say they thought Day would be the successful party.
We find in the case of the United States vs. Dodqe, 2 Gallis
C. C. Reports, the law on this point thus expressed: "If the party
against whom an attachment has issued for a contempt, by his affidavit and answers to interrogatories discharge himself of the contempt, no further proceedings can be had against him in the attachment; but if perjury appear, he will be recognized to answer," &c.
But is there anything in this extraordinary sale, and in what took
place between its execution and rescission, which can be considered
a disobedience to the injunction ?
There can be no doubt, that a part of the goods sold by Day to
Rogers and Wyckoff, consisted of vulcanized rubber, manufactured
prior to the 17th of September, and an infringement of Goodyear's
patent; and, also, that a part of these goods were sold by Rogers
and Wyckoff, before the decision.
Did the testimony fix with certainty, that the vending of the
vulcanized rubber goods after the service of the injunction was
made, under the direction of Mr. Day, I should be inclined to report him in contempt, for I hold the law to be, that as soon as the
decree was entered, confirming the right of Mr. Goodyear, all goods
manufactured in infringement of that right, were contraband, and
any sale or intermeddling with them, would be a using in disobedience of the injunction.
But the testimony does not show that after the 28th of September, 1852, Mr. Day manufactured or sold any prohibited article,
and his liability, if any, must rest upon his consent and knowledge
of what Rogers & Wyckoff did.
The law upon this point appears to be, that one may be guilty of
a breach of an injunction, by aiding and abetting those who are
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committing an act inconsistent with it, although he should not gctually take part in such act.
Did Rogers & Wyckoff, after the 28th of September, 1852, do
any act inconsistent with the injunction ? if they did, it must have
been by vending the prohibited articles. Now, in the language c
one of the cases cited, Zfagennis vs. Parkhurst,3 Green's Chancery Reports, 434, "the party alleging a contempt of court by breach
of an injunction, must make it out clearly to the satisfaction of the
court." The defendant has denied the contempt under oath. Does
the testimony of Rogers & Wyckoff, and Helm prove it? Helm in
his answer, says, that after the 28th of September he mixed rubber
compdund for heating, for the purpose of making shirred cloth, and
nothing else, and there were shoes made up out of the compound,
which was prepared, or partially prepared before the decision;
nothing but shoes. William H. Rogers estimated the sales at 23
Courtland street, between the 17th of September and the 19th of
October, at from $15,000 to $20,000, and to the question, of that
sum, about how much was vulcanized india-rubber goods ? he answers that if the webbing or shirred cloth be considered vulcanized,
then two-thirds of the sales were velcanized, and he does not recollect
that during that period, Day made himself responsible for any debt
contracted by Rogers & Wyckoff. He further says that Rogers &
Wyckoff continued after the decision, to sell vulcanized rubber
goods, including over-shoes, but that Day did not induce him or
Wyckoff to sell vulcanized rubber goods to any person; the persons
having goods on consignment made returns of their sales to Rogers
& Wyckoff, but Mr. Day did not receive any moneys fromh them;
that there was not ever at any time any understanding that Day
should have any interest in the business or property after the sale
of the 17th of September, or that Rogers & Wyckoff should act as
agents for Day, or that the business should be conducted for Day's
benefit.
Amos D. Wyckoff, who was the principal book-keeper, and was constantly at the store, 23 Courtland street, says that Rogers & Wyckoff
did sell vulcanized rubber goods, which had been manufactured
by Day before the 17th of September, and included in the sale, but
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the quantity he cannot tell, and that what remained were retransferred to Day, and remain in the store, No. 23 Cortland street.
The testimony of this witness does not show any participation of
Day in the sales, or that he aided therein.
It was insisted by the counsel of relator, that the sale of the
17th of September was fraudulent and void, but however unusual
the terms of payment may be, and however insufficient the security, still it is not perceived that these are unmistakeable marks
of fraud. The sale was good between the parties, and passed the
title from Day to Rogers and Wyckoff, and however void as against
Goodyear, if it had not been rescinded, it is valid between the
parties.
It cannot be concealed that the sale of the 17th of September,
and its rescission, are marked with some extraordinary features,
but they do not, in my opinion, make the acts of Rogers & Wyckoff
those of Day, and bring him within the severe consequences of
having disobeyed the injunction, and thus subject him to fine and
imprisonment. Besides any damage which Goodyear may have
sustained, can be ascertained and liquidated by the master, who is
yet to take an account of all the rubber goods manufactured and
sold by the defendant, in violation of the patent of the complain"
ant.
Much time has been spent in the investigation of this subject,
but the master does not think that it has been misspent, for it was
right that this whole transaction should be disclosed. Though the
examination in the case was continued for several days, it was not
a case of oppression on the part of the complainant.
All these suggestions are respectfully submitted to the court, and
the master reports on this branch of the case that, in his opinion,
under the true construction of the act of Congress, of March, 1831,
and the testimony taken, the defendant, Horace H. Day, is not in
contempt.'
IThe court subsequently confirmed the Master's report.-Eds.Am. L. Rey.

